The rise of artificial intelligence is often portrayed as the arrival of non-human intelligences that can rival and emulate aspects of human cognition and communication. The classical test of artificial intelligence in the 20th century was the Turing (1950) test which focuses on the natural language processing skills of dialogue partners to establish a baseline for the presence of intelligence. In this session I will explore some of the philosophical assumptions and controversies associated with artificial intelligence. I will review some of the arguments made by philosophers against the possibility of machine intelligence (e.g. Searle 1980, 1984; Dennett, 1978; Dreyfus 1979) and summarise what is at stake in contemporary debates around AI. Some contemporary researchers claim to have beaten the Turing test while others reject it as a measure of artificial intelligence (e.g. in favour of Kolmogorov complexity (1963)). I further contextualise these tensions with respect to the potential pedagogical affordances of AI and its relation to human subjectivity.